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INTRODUCTION

In one context or another, the turmoil in the Middle East has
been tragic not only for the states in the region but for the prospects of world peace. Because of this, the United States has been
both directly and indirectly involved in the crises that have
erupted there from time to time. A major milestone was reached
when, largely due to the personal efforts of President Carter,
Egypt and Israel signed the Camp David agreements on September 17, 1978, in Washington, D.C. The United States played a key
role in the execution of these agreements and consequential instruments. Indeed, it assumed sizable financial obligations to ensure the success of the goals of peace outlined in these agreements. It is possible to appreciate that role politically; moreover,
the legal aspects of this matter require careful scrutiny, because it
may not be immediately clear what obligations or rights the
United States acquired under international law as a consequence
of this involvement. This Article attempts to determine the legal
status of the United States involvement in the process initiated at
Camp David in 1978.1
1. The terms "Camp David Peace Process" or "Camp David Process" as
used in this Article connote the two "Frameworks" or "Agreements" for peace
signed on September 17, 1978, between Egypt and Israel, the peace treaty signed
by those countries on March 26, 1979, various letters executed by those two
countries and the United States, and other related agreements. See generally
Bassiouni, An Analysis of Egyptian Peace Policy Toward Israel: From Resolution 242 (1967) to the 1979 Peace Treaty, 12 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 3 (1980)
(the Palestinian question); Camp David Accords, 76 CuRRENT HIsT. 31 (1979)
(portions of the 1978 Agreement reprinted); Dellafar & Pack, Economic Benefits
of Peace in the Middle East - Some Cautionary Notes - Some Potential
Benefits, MIDDLE E. REV., Spring 1979, at 10 (effect of the 1978 Agreement on
Egypt and Israel); Draper, How Not to Make Peace in the Middle East, COMMENTARY, Mar. 1979, at 23 (problems with 1978 Agreement caused by the United
States - Soviet Union agreement); Halperin, Back to Camp David, NEW REPUELIC, Mar. 3, 1979, at 14 (1979 Agreement indirectly initiated by the United
States - Soviet Union negotiations); Hitchins, America's Cuba - Can Sadat
Survive Camp David?, 228 NATION 289 (1979) (President Sadat's dilemma
caused by the 1978 Agreement); Mallison & Mallison, An International Law
Analysis of the Major United Nations Resolutions Concerning the Palestine
Question, U.N. Doc. ST/SG/SER.F4, U.N. Sales No. E.791.19 (1979) (the Palestinian question); Plascov, The Palestine Predicament After Camp David, 34
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This inquiry may be approached by initially raising two questions. Was the United States a party to the Camp David agreements or to the treaty subsequently signed between Egypt and
Israel in 1979? The short answer based on a prima facie reading
of the texts is no.2 This leads to the second question: If the
United States is technically not a party to the agreements or to
the treaty, can it still claim any right or be placed under any duty
vis-a-vis Egypt and Israel by international law as a consequence
of the role it played in this historic event? The answer to this
question is not facile and depends upon a careful examination of
the various instruments which eventually emerged as a consequence of the signing of the agreements on September 17, 1978.
Therefore, before determining the legal status of the United
States in the Camp David process, these texts must be examined.
This Article will discuss what the parties were attempting to accomplish with the different instruments in order to determine
precisely what the United States undertook to do to achieve the
goals of these agreements. Accordingly, this Article examines
chronologically the agreements, the Treaty of Peace, and the accompanying letters involving the United States, Egypt, and Israel
before evaluating the legal status of the United States involvement in this process. The remainder of this Article is divided into
five sections. First, all instruments resulting from the Camp
David agreements will be analyzed. Second, some of the relevant
issues raised by that analysis will be identified. Third, the rules of
law with a potential effect upon the issues will be outlined.
Fourth, these rules will be applied to the issues. Finally, concluding remarks about the legal status of the United States involvement in the Camp David process will be offered and the future
role of the United States will be projected briefly.
II.

TH E CAP DAvD PROCESS
A.

The Instruments

The instruments resulting from the Camp David process were

WORLD TODAY 467 (1978) (problems caused by the 1978 Agreement); Rosen &

Fukuyama, Egypt and Israel After Camp David, 76 CURRENT HIST. 1 (1979)
(impact of the 1978 Agreement).

2. A simple reading of the Agreements and the Peace Treaty reveals that
they were executed and signed between Egypt and Israel. The instruments were
"witnessed" by the President of the United States.
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issued in two phases: the first phase revolves around the
Frameworks and the second is in the context of the Peace Treaty.
Only matters dealing with the legal implications of United States
involvement in the Camp David process will be emphasized.
The first document arising out of Camp David is the Exchange
of Remarks between the President[of the United States], President Sadat, and Prime Minister Begin at the Signing of the
Camp David Agreements, September 7, 1978.1 This exchange
consists of speeches given by President Carter, President Sadat,
and Prime Minister Begin. President Carter began by declaring
the significance of the signing of two important Agreements between Egypt and Israel.4 These speeches, which have no legal significance, contain only generalities. They include, however, the
following words of President Sadat, which show Egypt's assessment of the nature of United States involvement: "The continuation of your active role is indispensable. We need your help and
the support of the American people." These remarks indicate
that Egypt expected the United States to continue to be active in
the process initiated by the Camp David agreements.
The Agreements referred to above emerged in the shape of two
"Frameworks." These Frameworks bear the date of September
17, 1978, and are entitled "A Framework for Peace in the Middle
East"6 and "A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty
3. 17 I.L.M. 1463 (1978).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1464.

6. Id. at 1466. In this document, President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin
agreed on the following important details in the Framework for Peace in the

Middle East.
The preamble to the document provides that "[t]he agreed basis for a peace-

ful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its neighbors is United Nations
Security Council Resolution 242, in all its parts." Id. The preamble provides

further:
Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace
within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force
.... Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation
between nations which enjoy normal relations.
Id. at 1467.

The framework of the document concerns primarily: (1) the West Bank and
Gaza; (2) Egypt and Israel; and (3) other associated principles. As a general

statement, the framework provides that "the parties are determined to reach a
just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict through

the conclusion of peace treaties based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and
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Between Egypt and Israel."'7 The first Framework, while expressing far-reaching goals for a comprehensive Middle East peace,
has one provision, clause 5, that directly addresses the matter of
United States involvement. By this clause Egypt and Israel
agreed to "invite" United States participation when "implementing" the agreements and the "timetable" and "modalities" involved therein. A major part of the implementation of this agreement relates to the future of occupied territory. Both parties
clearly wanted to consult with the United States in that process.

338 in all their parts." Id.
Regarding the West Bank and Gaza, the document provides that Egypt,
Israel, Jordan, and representatives of the Palestinian people should participate
in resolving the "Palestinian Problem" in the following three stages.
First, a transition period of up to five years should exist in which the Israeli
military government of the West Bank and Gaza should be turned over to a
"self-governing authority [which] has been freely elected by the inhabitants of
these areas." Id.
Second, "Egypt, Israel and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing
the elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and
Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed." Id.
Finally, negotiations to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza
should begin no later than three years after the beginning of the transitional
period. Id. at 1468.
Regarding the Egypt-Israel relationship, the document provides that those
countries shall settle disputes by the means provided in article 33 of the Charter
of the United Nations. The use or threat of force may not be used. Moreover,
peace negotiations are governed by the Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace
Treaty Between Egypt and Israel. Id. at 1468-69.
The broad principles contained in the document could apply to future peace
treaties between Israel and Jordan, Syria, or Lebanon. Moreover, the agreement
calls for the abolition of economic boycotts and the guarantee of due process of
law for citizens of the parties. Id. at 1469. Other associated principles concern
the United States and the United Nations. Regarding the United States, the
agreement stipulates that "[tihe United States shall be invited to participate in
the talks on matters related to the modalities of the implementation of the
agreements and working out the timetable for the carrying out of the obligations
of the parties." Id. Regarding the United Nations, the agreement provides:
The United Nations Security Council shall be requested to endorse the
peace treaties and ensure that their provisions shall not be violated. The
permanent members of the Security Council shall be requested to underwrite the peace treaties and ensure respect for their provisions. They shall
also be requested to conform their policies and actions with the undertakings contained in this Framework.
Id.
7. Id. at 1470.

80
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Apart from Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian territory, for which
separate agreement is clearly contemplated, a major part of this
Framework deals with the Palestinian question. 8 Certain arrangements are envisaged; some include involving third parties, such as
Jordan, to make possible what the Framework calls "self-government" for the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza.' Prima
facie, either of the parties, or both, could "consult" with the
United States in order to secure these goals. 10
It should be carefully noted, however, that this particular instrument does not have the legal status of a treaty. The Framework is essentially a declaration of intent and by its terms aims at
creating future treaties to bring peace to the entire region. In law,
clause 5 does not establish any right or duty for either of the parties to call upon the United States. Politically, however, this point
may have considerable significance, for it emphasizes the continued involvement of the United States in the international relations affecting the Middle East.
The second document, executed simultaneously with the first,
is the "Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between
Egypt and Israel."" This Framework essentially provides (i) that
the parties should conclude a peace treaty within three months
after the signing of the Framework, (ii) that negotiations should
be conducted under the United Nations flag, and (iii) that Resolution 242 should govern all resolutions between Israel and
Egypt. 2 It further provides that the peace treaty shall be implemented within two or three years after its signing.' 3 Substantively, this Framework provides that Israel will withdraw from,
and Egypt will regain sovereignty over, the Sinai. 14 It calls for
each party to recognize the other's international borders,1 5 enables Egypt to have non-military use of abandoned Israeli airfields in the Sinai, and gives Israel free passage through the Suez
Canal, the Gulf of Suez, the Strait of Tiran, and the Gulf of
Aqaba. The Framework further provides for construction of a
highway between Egypt and Jordan and for the specific stationing
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 1466-67.
Id. at 1467.
Id. at 1469.
Id. at 1470.

12. Id.

13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1471.
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of military forces. The Framework was signed by President Sadat
and Prime Minister Begin and witnessed by President Carter.
B. The Letters
There are ten related letters between the three leading figures
of the Camp David process: 16
(1) a letter to President Carter from Prime Minister Begin informing the President of the pending vote in the Knesset to remove Israeli settlers in the Northern and Southern Sinai
1
regions;
(2) a letter to President Sadat from President Carter informing
President Sadat of Prime Minister Begin's letter;"8
(3) a letter to President Carter from President Sadat stating
that if the Israeli settlers are not removed, the Framework shall
be void and invalid; 9
(4) a letter from President Carter to Prime Minister Begin
in20
forming Prime Minister Begin of President Sadat's letter;
(5) a letter to President Carter from President Sadat describing
Egypt's views on the status of Jerusalem, stating that Arab Jerusalem is part of the West Bank and shall remain part of the West
1
Bank;

2

(6) a letter to President Carter from Prime Minister Begin informing President Carter that Jerusalem is the undivided capital
22
of the State of Israel;

(7) a letter to President Sadat from President Carter informing
President Sadat that the United States position remains as
"stated by Ambassador Goldberg in the United Nations General
Assembly on July 14, 1967, and subsequently by Ambassador
Yost in the United Nations Security Council on July 1, 1969";23

(8) a letter to President Carter from President Sadat stating
16. For text of those letters between the heads of state, see id. at 1471.
17. Id. (dated Sept. 17, 1978).
18. Id. (dated Sept. 22, 1978).
19. Id. at 1472 (dated Sept. 17, 1978).
20. Id. (dated Sept. 22, 1978).
21. Id. at 1473 (dated Sept. 17, 1978).
22. Id. (dated Sept. 17, 1978).
23. Id. (dated Sept. 22, 1978). For the text of the statements, see U.S. Abstains on U.N. Resolution on Jerusalem; Urges Steps Toward Peace in Near
East, 57 DEPT. ST. BULL. 148 (1967) (statement of Ambassador Goldberg), and
United States Reaffirms Position on Jerusalem, 61 DEPT. ST. BULL. 76 (1969)
(statement of Ambassador Yost).
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that, "to ensure the implementation of the provisions related to
the West Bank and Gaza and in order to safeguard the legitimate
rights of the Palestinian people, Egypt will be prepared to assume
the Arab role emanating from these provisions, following consulJordan and the representatives of the Palestinian
tations with
24
people";
(9) a letter to Prime Minister Begin from President Carter clarifying that, where the Framework provisions refer to Palestinians
or Palestinian peoples, Israel understands the term to mean Palestinian Arabs, and, where the Framework speaks of the West
Bank, Israel understands it to mean Judea and Samaria;25 and
(10) a letter to Ezer Weizman, Israel's Minister of Defense,
from Secretary of Defense Harold Brown discussing United
States assistance for air bases that Israel plans to build and stating that President Carter was prepared to seek congressional
funding and approval for other assistance.2"
This tenth letter is the first statement by the United States
that proposes United States assistance to Israel with regard to the
Peace Treaty envisaged by the Frameworks and the proposed
transfer of Egyptian territory. The executive branch does not
promise funds, but informs Israel of its willingness to seek funds
to finance military airbases which Israel considers necessary for
its security after the return of the Sinai. Furthermore, this letter
suggests or promises future action of a bilateral nature between
Israel and the United States. The United States executive branch
did obtain the congressional approval necessary to provide the
type of assistance suggested in this and later documents.
Pursuant to the second Framework, a treaty was signed between Egypt and Israel approximately six months after the Camp
David process began. This Treaty included annexes and was accompanied by several letters.
C.

The Peace Treaty

The 1979 Treaty of Peace, 27 the major instrument of this phase
24. 17 I.L.M. 1474 (dated Sept. 17, 1978).
25.

Id. (dated Sept. 22, 1978).

26. Id. (dated Sept. 28, 1978).
27. Treaty of Peace, Mar. 26, 1979, Egypt-Israel, 18 I.L.M. 362 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Treaty of Peace]. The Treaty is composed primarily of a preamble and seven articles. The following is a brief synopsis of the -Treaty's key

elements.
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of the Camp David process, addresses matters between Egypt and
Israel and does not directly involve the United States. In Annex I
the treaty contains provisions concerning security arrangements
following the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai.2 8 The appendix to

this annex is relevant because article VII directly involves the
United States by requesting that the United States provide aerial
surveillance during the withdrawal period.29 This clause is imporThe preamble provides that a peace settlement between Egypt and Israel
must be based upon United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338
as well as the Camp David Framework.
Article I provides for the termination of war and establishes peace upon the
treaty's ratification. Article I also provides for the withdrawal of Israeli military
and civilians from the Sinai, as well as the concomitant reestablishment of
Egypt's sovereignty over the Sinai. Id. at 363.
Article II establishes permanent boundaries between Egypt and Israel and
emphasizes respect of each other's territorial integrity including airspace and
waters. Id.
Article IV provides for the United Nations to lend forces and observers to
oversee Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai. Id. at 364-65.
Article V guarantees Israel the right of passage to the Gulf of Suez, the Suez
Canal, the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba. Id. at 365.
Article VII provides that disputes arising out of the treaty are to be resolved
by arbitration. Id. at 366.
28. Id. at 367. Annex I is entitled "Protocol Concerning Israeli Withdrawal
and Security Arrangements." Id. Its major provisions are contained in its articles I, II, VI and VII.
Article I details the multistaged withdrawal of Israel from the Sinai and the
formation of a Joint Commission to supervise and coordinate that withdrawal.
Id.
Article II describes the final lines and zones between Egypt and Israel and the
armaments allowed in each zone.
Article VI outlines the permissible operations of the United Nations forces
and observers during and after the withdrawal. Id. at 371.
Article VII provides for the establishment of a "liason system" upon the dissolution of the Joint Commission. Id. at 373.
29. Id. at 374. The appendix pertains to the organization of movements in
the Sinai. The main provisions of the appendix are contained in its articles I, II,
III, and VII.
Article I provides the principles of withdrawal. Id. at 374-75.
Article II provides a description of subphases of withdrawal to interim withdrawal lines. Id. at 375-77.
Article III defines United Nations forces and observers. Id. at 377-78.
Article VII governs surveillance activities. It provides in relevant part that
aerial surveillance activities during the withdrawal will be carried out as follows:
1. Both Parties request the United States to continue airborne surveillance flights in accordance with previous agreements until the completion

84
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tant for two reasons. First, it shows that both Egypt and Israel
were eager to involve the United States during the Sinai withdrawal to ensure compliance with the treaty. Second, this was a
method of temporarily associating the United States directly with
the terms of the Peace Treaty. The involvement terminated automatically with the transfer of the Sinai to Egypt. Consequently,
this is not a matter of long-term legal significance.
D.

Letters and Memoranda Relating to the Treaty

The following is a list of the letters and memoranda executed
between Egypt, Israel, and the United States in the context of the
Peace Treaty.
The first letter 30 states that both parties will conduct future negotiations to effect a total peace in the Middle East and concludes, "This letter also confirms our understanding that the
United States Government will participate fully in all stages of
negotiations." 31 Although important in a political sense, this is
simply an invitation by Egypt and Israel to have the United
States participate in further negotiations and does not create legal obligations for the United States.
Another letter, to President Sadat from President Carter, dated
March 26, 1979, is important because it states:
I wish to confirm to you that subject to United States Constitutional processes:
In the event of an actual or threatened violation of the Treaty of
Peace between Egypt and Israel, the United States will, on request
of one or both of the Parties, consult with the Parties with respect
thereto and will take such other action as it may deem appropriate
and helpful to achieve compliance with the Treaty.
The United States will conduct aerial monitoring as requested
by the Parties pursuant to Annex I of the Treaty.
The United States believes the Treaty provision for permanent
stationing of United Nations personnel in the designated limited
force zone can and should be implemented by the United Nations
of final Israeli withdrawal.
2. Both Parties request the United States operated Sinai Field Mission
to continue its operation in accordance with previous agreements until
completion of the Israeli withdrawal from the area east of the Giddi and
Mitla Passes. Thereafter, the Mission will be terminated.
Id. at 384.
30. Id. at 530.
31. Id. at 531.
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Security Council. The United States will exert its utmost efforts to
obtain the requisite action by the Security Council. If the Security
Council fails to establish and maintain the arrangements called for
in the Treaty, the President will be prepared to take those steps
necessary to ensure the establishment and maintenance of an acceptable alternative multinational force. 2

Two points with respect to this letter need to be stressed. First,
President Carter, while committing the Government to oversee
and protect the peace process, did so "subject to United States
Constitutional processes." As this letter is clearly not a treaty,
this qualification refers to the need for congressional action
should the United States commit funds or troops to international
peacekeeping forces. Thus, in this letter the United States undertook no immediately binding legal obligation. Second, this letter
is essentially an incentive: the United States will take various actions to ensure the "implementation" of the Treaty after the
"withdrawal provisions" executed between Egypt and Israel take
effect. In sum, though this letter is important, it creates no important and far-reaching legal rights or obligations. Nevertheless,
the first part of this letter requires examination to determine
whether it proposed future United States mediation, and if so, to
what extent. This analysis is contained in section V of this
Article.
A memorandum between the United States and Israel concerns
the supply of oil to Israel for fifteen years.33 This agreement will
be analyzed briefly below. At this point it is sufficient to note that
through this bilateral agreement the United States promised to
supply oil to Israel for a certain period of time. This is clearly a
binding agreement and was approved subsequently by Congress.
Another "Memorandum of Agreement" between the United
States and Israel3 4 contains observations on the role of the United
States in the Camp David process. This memorandum, drafted by
the United States, states as follows:
Recognizing that the withdrawal from Sinai imposes additional
heavy security, military and economic burdens on Israel;
The Government of the United States of America and of the
State of Israel, subject to their constitutional processes and applicable law, confirm as follows:
32. Id. at 532-33.
33. Id. at 533.
34. Id. at 537.
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1. In the light of the role of the United States in achieving the
Treaty of Peace and the Parties' desire that the United States continue its supportive efforts, the United States will take appropriate
measures to promote full observance of the Treaty of Peace.
2. Should it be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the United
States that there has been a violation or threat of violation of the
Treaty of Peace, the United States will consult with the parties
with regard to measures to halt or prevent the violation, ensure
observance of the Treaty of Peace, enhance friendly and peaceful
relations between the parties and promote peace in the region, and
will take such remedial measures as it deems appropriate, which
may include diplomatic economic and military measures as described below.
3. The United States will provide support it deems appropriate
for proper actions taken by Israel in response to such demonstrated violations of the Treaty of Peace. In particular, if a violation of the Treaty of Peace is deemed to threaten the security of
Israel, including inter alia, a blockade of Israel's use of international waterways, a violation of the provisions of the Treaty of
Peace concerning limitation of forces or an armed attack against
Israel, the United States will be prepared to consider, on an urgent
basis, such measures as the strengthening of the United States
presence in the area, the providing of emergency supplies to Israel,
and the exercise of maritime rights in order to put an end to the
violation.3 5
The Prime Minister of Egypt, Mostafa Khalil, responded by
writing to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance protesting the implication that Egypt lacked good faith in carrying out the agreement.3 6
The following passages from that letter represent Egypt's view of
the United States role in the peace process:
I trust that you would agree that this new definition of the
United States role constitutes a departure from our understanding
of that role as a full partner and not as an arbiter. It also constitutes a distortion of that role in the eyes of others.
The United States assumed for herself the role of the arbiter in
determining that there has been a violation or threat of violation of
the Treaty. I wish to state that the Treaty provides for settlement
of disputes procedured in Article VII. This equal right to have recourse to the procedure specified in the Treaty ensures that the
balance of corresponding obligations will be maintained. The pro-

35. Id. at 538.
36. Id. at 536.
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posed Memorandum therefore constitutes a prejudgment of the
outcome of future disputes, a matter which, in point of fact,
amounts to negating the existence of an article on dispute
settlement."
The Prime Minister of Egypt went on to remind the United
States that its earlier position was somewhat different. He said:
Furthermore, the letter addressed to the Prime Minister of Israel
on March 26, 1979, by the President of the United States stipulates that: "In the event of an actual or threatened violation of the
Treaty of Peace between Israel and Egypt, the United States will,
on request of one or both of the Parties, consult with the Parties
with respect thereto and will take such other action as it may deem
appropriate and helpful to achieve compliance with the Treaty."
The Government of Egypt therefore reiterates that the concept
and orientation of the proposed Memorandum is detrimental to
the peace process.
Needless to say that Egypt does not consider itself bound by
that Memorandum or whatever commitments to which it was not a
party or on which it was not consulted."
This letter is important, for it helps to interpret the Framework
and the Peace Treaty. In Egypt's view, the United. States was a
"full partner," and not an "arbiter." Though "full partner" does
not connote legal status as a party to the instruments, it does signify'that Egypt considered the United States role to be that of a
party extremely interested in the resolution of the Middle East
conflict. Also, this letter clearly emphasizes that the United
States was not to "arbitrate" possible future disputes but that, at
least for Egypt, the United States role was merely that of a friend
providing assistance to two of its friends who were former adversaries.3 9 Egypt sent another letter expressing similar concerns on
the following day.40 In paragraphs 7 and 8 of the earlier letter the

37.

Id.

38. Id. at 537.
39.

Id.

40. Letter from Mostafa Khalil, Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Cyrus R. Vance, United States Secretary of State (Mar. 26, 1979), reprinted in id.
at 540-41. The letter stated:
Pursuant to my letter of yesterday concerning the proposed Memorandum of Agreement between U.S. and Israel I wish to inform you of the
following:
While Egypt does not contest the right of the United States Government, or any other government for that matter, to take the decisions it
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Egyptian Prime Minister appeared to say that, through its agreedeems compatible with its foreign policy, the Government of Egypt maintains the right not to accept any decision or action which it considers directed against Egypt. I would like to state that the contents of the proposed Memorandum will have a direct bearing on the Peace Treaty.
You are certainly aware of the keen desire of Egypt to strengthen the
friendly relations between our two countries as well as to establish peace
and stability in the whole region. This will be furthered by achieving a
peace treaty between Egypt and Israel as an important step towards a
comprehensive settlement of the conflict in the Middle East. Bearing this
in mind, I want you to know that we were deeply disappointed to find the
United States accepting to enter into an agreement we consider directed
against Egypt. The Memorandum does not serve any useful purpose. On
the contrary, its contents and purpose would adversely affect the whole
process of peace and stability in the area.
Egypt rejects the Memorandum for the following reasons:
1. It is contrary to the spirit existing between our two countries and
does not contribute to the strengthening of relations between them. I wish
to put on record that Egypt was never consulted on the substance of the
proposed memorandum.
2. The contents of the proposed memorandum are based upon alleged
accusations against Egypt and providing for certain measures to be taken
against her in that hypothetical case of violations, the determination of
which is largely left to Israel.
3. We have been engaged in the final process of negotiating the Treaty
for over a month now, however, we have not been notified of the intention
of the United States to agree on such a memorandum. Moreover, we
learned of it by way of information and not consultation. Ambassador
Eilts gave it to me at 2:00 p.m., March 25, only 24 hours before the scheduled ceremonies for signature of the Treaty.
4. The United States is supposed to be a partner in a tripartite effort
to achieve peace and not to support the allegations of one side against the
other.
5. The proposed Memorandum assumes that Egypt is the side liable to
violate its obligations.
6. The proposed Memorandum could be construed as an eventual alliance between the United States and Israel against Egypt.
7. It gives the United States certain rights that were never mentioned
or negotiated with us.
8. It gives the United States the power to impose measures, or to put it
bluntly, punitive measures, a matter which raises doubt about the future
relations and could affect the situation in the whole region.
9. The proposed Memorandum even uses dangerously vague terms as
"threats of violations" against which certain measures would be taken. We
consider this to be a matter of grave consequences.
10. It implies that the economic and arms supply are subject to the
sole judgment of the United States Government in connection with the
alleged threats of violations being attributed to one side.
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ment with Israel, the United States was assuming certain rights
vis-&-vis Egypt. That the United States did not do so in law is
clear for two reasons. First, in article 1 of the agreement the
United States committed itself to continue its supportive role in
the peace process. 41 Second, in article 2 the United States clearly
agreed to consult with both parties in order to maintain friendly
relations between them.4 2 Thus, this letter is significant only because it shows Egypt's displeasure with the contents of the
United States-Israeli agreement. Indeed, at the end of the letter,
the Egyptian Prime Minister said that his country considered this
agreement void. Void or not, the agreement is not directly relevant to the general inquiry of this Article.
Before examining the norms of international law which may apply to this set of facts, three preliminary observations may be
made. First, except for the separate agreements with Israel concerning military and economic compensation for vacating the Si-

11. It makes certain aspects of Egyptian-American relations to be subject to elements extraneous to those relations and its commitments made
to a third party.
12. It implies the United States acquiescence to Israel's embarking on
measures, including military measures, against Egypt on the assumption
that there are violations or threats of violation of the Treaty.
13. It gives the United States the right to impose a military presence in
the region for reasons agreed between Israel and the United States. A matter which we cannot accept.
14. The proposed Memorandum will cast grave doubts about the real
intention of the United States, especially in connection with the peace

process. It could be accused of collaboration with Israel to create such circumstances that would lead to American military presence in the area, a
matter which would certainly have serious implications especially on the
stability in the whole region.

15. It will have adverse effects in Egypt towards the United States and
would certainly drive other Arab countries to take a harder position
against the peace process, and would give added reasons for them not to
participate in that process.

16. It would also pave the way for other alliances to be formed in the
area to counter the one whose seeds could be found in the proposed
Memorandum.

For all these reasons, I hereby inform you that the Government of Egypt
will not recognize the legality of the Memorandum and considers it null
and void and as having no effect whatsoever so far as Egypt is concerned.
'Id.

41. Memorandum of the Agreement between the United States of America
and the State of Israel, Mar. 26, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 9825.

42. Id.
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nai, the United States does not appear to be a party, in a technical legal sense, to the Frameworks, the Agreements, or the Peace
Treaty between Egypt and Israel. It remains to be seen whether
further analysis of the facts and texts can contradict this prima
facie evaluation. Second, the United States was intimately involved in the creation of the various instruments, and these instruments contain references to consultations with the United
States in the event of possible controversies. These facts might
give the United States the specific role of an arbitrator or mediator. This Article will categorize the assigned role of the United
States and determine whether this role has a specific label under
international law. Third, some of the instruments suggest various
unilateral acts that the United States may undertake to assist implementation of the peace process between Egypt and Israel. This
Article will determine the juristic consequences of such acts. The
basic issue is: Can these instruments legally bind the United
States to Egypt, to Israel, or to third parties?

Ill. THE IssuEs RAISED
Four questions are relevant to this analysis:
(1) Though technically not a party to the two Frameworks or
the Treaty, can the United States still be considered, under the
applicable rules of international law, to have become one by construction or necessary intendment of diverse provisions in these
instruments?
(2) What obligations or rights accrue to the United States as a
result of its unilateral declarations or assurances contained in letters (some involving the commitment, or implicating commitment
of substantial funds) written by the President of the United
States or agencies of the Government to the two parties to the
Agreements?
(3) If rights or duties do devolve upon the United States, what
role should that country play in relation to the two parties that
formally signed the Agreements, or vis-&-vis third parties?
(4) What is the status of the memoranda of agreement entered
into by the United States?
The answers to the above questions will determine the legal
status of the United States involvement in the Camp David process, yet the novelty of the facts involved renders it difficult to
find the applicable law. Also, the language of the Frameworks, the
Treaty, and particularly the letters exchanged as a result thereof,
is (perhaps deliberately) so diplomatic that it is not easy to iden-
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tify clearly the precise legal consequences resulting from violation
of the pertinent clauses. Nevertheless, with this caveat this Article will attempt to interpret those provisions or clauses that reasonably may give rise to legal implications for the United States.
IV. THE RELEVANT PRINCLLES

OF LAW

Because of the peculiar facts of the situation, this section will
outline those broad principles which may apply to the four questions raised in section III. After such an examination one might of
course conclude that one or more of the principles does not in
fact apply or govern the situation.
A.

The Law of Treaties: Position of Third Parties

The fundamental principle regarding the effect of treaties is
that treaties create rights and duties solely for the parties; this
has been represented by the classic maxim, pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt. This principle of law also has been incorporated into the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 48 Article 24 of the Convention specifically states that "a treaty does not
create either obligations or rights for a third state without its consent. '44 Both the Convention and the draft of the International
Law Commission acknowledge this as the "general rule."'45 Thus,
a treaty cannot place any obligation on a state that is not a party
to it. A treaty will place an obligation on a third party state only
if that state actually consents. Article 35 of the Convention explicates: "[A]n obligation arises for a third State from a provision of
a treaty if the parties to the treaty intend the provision to be the
means of establishing the obligation and the third State expressly
accepts that obligation in writing."46 Furthermore, although
under article 34 even a right cannot be conferred on a third state
without its consent, a presumption to that effect may be raised if
the state concerned does not disclaim the right and at the same
time accepts the terms and conditions imposed by the treaty. Article 36 provides:

43. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Law of Treaties].
44.

Id. art. 34.

45. See United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, First and Second
Sessions, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/Add. 2, arts. 30-34 (1971); Law of Treaties, supra
note 43, arts. 34-38.
46. Law of Treaties, supra note 43, art. 35.
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1. A right arises for a third State from a provision of a treaty if
the parties to the treaty intend the provision to accord that right
either to the third State, or to a group of States to which it belongs, or to all States, and the third State assents thereto. Its assent shall be presumed so long as the contrary is not indicated,
unless the treaty otherwise provides.
2. A State exercising a right in accordance with paragraph 1
for in the
shall comply with the conditions for its exercise provided
47
treaty or established in conformity with the treaty.
Thus, if these criteria are met, a third state may claim a right
under a given treaty. Nevertheless, as in the case of the "obligation," a form of consent first must be located.
Though the Convention and the classical law stress that a state
that is not a party to a treaty cannot claim or be placed under a
duty without its consent, some authority for a slightly different
view is said to exist in the judgment of the Permanent Court of
International Justice in the case of Free Zones of Upper Savoy
and the District of Gex.4 8 In that case the court held that, if it
can be shown that the parties actually did intend to confer a right
on a third state, there is nothing in international law to frustrate
such an intention.49
In sum, under these principles the United States could have
acquired a right or obligation under the Camp David peace process only if (1) Egypt and Israel wanted to confer a right or place
the United States under an obligation and (2) the United States
actually consented to that acquisition.
B.

Interpretation of Treaties: Historical Approach

Unlike municipal law, international law has no technical rules
for interpreting treaties20 Nevertheless, because treaties and
47. Id. art. 36.
48. Free Zones of Upper Savoy & the Dist. of Gex (Fr. v. Switz.) 1932
P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 46, at 93 (Judgment of June 7).
49. Id. at 147-48. Such a view, however, does not represent the weight of
authority. Indeed, the dissenting judgments pointed out acute difficulties of such
a position. Id. at 174, 186, 200.
50. See generally D. GREIo, INTERNATIONAL LAW 373 (1970) ("There are no
technical rules in international law for the interpretation of treaties."). Some
commentators, however, argue in favor of establishing such rules. See Beckett,
Comments on the Report of Sir Hersh Lauterpacht,43 ANNUAIRE DE L'INsTrruT
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 435, 435-40 (1950); see also Fitzmaurice, The Law and
Procedureof the International Court of Justice 1951-4: Treaty Interpretation
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questions of interpretation invariably involve lawyers, it is natural that a lawyer's approach would be manifest in the process.
Under this approach a textual or literal reading of the instrument
usually is taken to represent the true intent of the parties.5 1 If
52
this method is less than satisfactory, one may examine context,
the practice of the parties, 53 or the preparatory work." Resort to
examination of the travaux preparatoiresis appropriate only if
the intent cannot be ascertained easily from a textual reading of
the agreements. As a caveat, it must be emphasized that the Per-

manent Court cautioned that this method of historical interpretation should be used only if the literal meaning of the instrument
is not clear. 55 Nevertheless, the Permanent Court itself on occaand CertainOther Points, 33 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 203 (1957) [hereinafter cited as
Fitzmaurice II]; Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International
Court of Justice: Treaty Interpretation and Certain Other Treaty Points, 28
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Fitzmaurice I].
51. For example, article 31 of the Vienna Convention dealing with matters of
interpretation provides:
General Rule of Interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context
and in light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall
comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in
connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the
other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that
the parties so intended.
Law of Treaties, supra note 43, art. 31.
52. Fitzmaurice H, supra note 50, at 227-28.
53. Fitzmaurice I, supra note 50, at 20-21.
54. See Lauterpacht, Some Observations on the Preparatory Work in the
Interpretationof Treaties, 48 HARv. L. Rav. 549 (1935).
55. See, e.g., S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A., No. 9, at 16
(Judgment of Sept. 7).
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sion
resorts to this technique as an aid in resolving matters before
58
it.

C. Unilateral Declarations of State: Legal Consequences
The third possible norm of law that may apply to the Camp
David agreements relates to unilateral declarations on the part of
a state. As discussed earlier, the United States appears to make
separate commitments in which some unilateral obligations are
assumed even though the instruments imply equally that the
United States was not a party to the Frameworks or the Peace
Treaty. Indeed, it is manifest that the commitments were
designed to induce the parties, particularly Israel, not to hesitate
when implementing the provisions of the Camp David
agreements.
Some authorities have argued that such unilateral declarations
of a state give rise to legal consequences.5 7 They maintain that
the effect of even an agreement-representing the most solemn
form of a legal obligation-depends upon the manifestation of an
intent or will to adhere to its provisions. The underlying theme is
intent." According to this view, a state may manifest the willingness to accept an obligation vis-a-vis other countries by its public
declarations. 9 Examples cited from post-World War II precedents include the 1957 Declaration by Egypt on the Suez Canal 0
56. See Convention of 1919 Concerning Employment of Women During the
Night (League of Nations), 1932 P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 50, at 380 (Advisory

opinion of Nov. 15). It therefore appears that, although this method may be
permissible, it cannot be used generally.
57.

E.g., Suy, LEs

AcTEs JURIDIQUES UNILATERAUX EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL

PUBLIc 22 (1962). The term "unilateral declaration" is used here to describe that
category of public statements of a state by which it manifests to accept specific
obligations towards a particular state or states in general without a reciprocal
undertaking from another state or states. Id.
58.

See J. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE vi, 105-11

(1973).
59. See South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia & Liberia v. S. Afr.), 1962 I.C.J.
318, 402-07, 417-18 (Judgment of Dec. 21) (Jessup, J., concurring); see also Fitzmaurice II, supra note 50, at 229-30 (certainly true when the other country relies
on the manifestation).
60. Declaration on the Suez Canal and the arrangements for its operation,

Apr. 24, 1957, Egypt, 265 U.N.T.S. 299. This declaration was communicated to
the Secretary General of the United Nations. Egypt posited that it was an "international instrument." Id. at 306.
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and the 1955 Declaration of Austrian Neutrality."1
Perhaps the most significant recent pronouncement on the subject came in the Nuclear Tests 12 case between Australia and

France before the International Court of Justice. The Court held
that France was legally bound by the official declarations and
public statements that expressed the intent to cease atmospheric
nuclear tests. 3 According to the court, the intention of the maker
of the declaration was determinative. The Court concluded that,
although the obligation was being assumed unilaterally, it still is
legally binding."4 Unlike agreements, there is no necessity in such
cases to find reciprocity because a quid pro quo is not required.
This case is strong authority for the proposition that under some
circumstances public statements of a state will give rise to binding obligations. Furthermore, these obligations can exist with respect to identified parties or ergo omnes. In the Nuclear Tests
case the statements in question apparently had been issued ergo
omnes and not to identified parties. It therefore seems that, jurisprudentially, a declaration of unilateral acts by a state to identified parties would be considered on a higher plane and would produce legal consequences for the maker of the declaration. 5
The quintessence of law regulating unilateral declarations resulting in binding obligations seems to be that: (a) It applies to a
unilateral assumption of obligations-one cannot arrogate rights
without the consent of those affected; and (b) one has to carefully
identify that a clear legal obligation is being assumed. It cannot
lightly be maintained that such an intention generally exists.6"

61. Bundesverfassungsgesetz vom 26. Oktober 1955 Ober die Neutralitit Osterreichs (B.G. B1. 1955, Nov. 4, 1955, No. 211), reprinted partially in Kunz,
Austria's Permanent Neutrality, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 418, 420 (1956).
62. (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 252 (Judgment of Dec. 20).
63. Id. at 267.
64. Id.
65. See Carbone, Promisein InternationalLaw: A Confirmationof Its Binding Force, 1 ITAL. Y.B. INT'L L. 166, 166-72 (1975); Rubin, The International
Effects of UnilateralDeclarations,71 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 1-30 (1977).
66. See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969

I.C.J. 3, 25 (Judgment of Feb. 20). The court stressed that a unilateral assumption of an international obligation was not to be taken "lightly" and intent could

only be evident if supported by consistent conduct and the clearest of language
in the declaration in question. Id.
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D. Executive Agreements: Binding Nature Under United
States Law
Under United States law, in addition to a treaty, the Government can conclude binding international agreements by executing
executive agreements.67 Basically, these agreements serve the
same purpose as treaties. As discussed below, the United States
did enter into transactions of this kind creating binding obligations vis-a-vis both parties to the Camp David agreements, particularly Israel.
V.

AN APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF LAW TO THE CAMP

DAVID AGREEMENTS

A. Application of the Relevant Law
The first question is whether the United States is a party to the
two Frameworks or to the Peace Treaty. Though the United
States Government was responsible for assembling the parties at
Camp David, and though President Carter witnessed the two
Frameworks, the United States is not a party to the "Framework
for Peace in the Middle East" or to the "Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel." In both
cases it acted as a friend of the two parties that formally signed
the agreement. That the Frameworks were signed at the White
House and, similarly, that the Peace Treaty was signed some six
months later on the White House lawn, does not alter that conclusion. The nature of United States participation, which at best
afforded the opportunity for the two parties to reach these agreements, does not make the United States a party to these agreements. The same comment applies to most of what is contained
in the letters between the two parties to the agreements and the
United States. Some commitments or assurances in the letters
may fall in the category of unilateral declarations or simple exec67.

See

DEPARTMENT oF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MNuAL CmcuLAR No. 175

(rev. ed. 1966).
'Executive agreement' is a term commonly used to designate international
agreements made by the President of the United States without the advice
and consent of the Senate given by the two-thirds majority requisite for

the conclusion of a treaty under the Constitution. The power of the President to make such agreements with and without the authorization or approval of Congress has been recognized by the Supreme Court ....
Lissitzyn, The Legal Status of Executive Agreements on Air Transportation,17
J. Am L. & COM. 436, 438 (1950).
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utive agreements made by the United States; they are separately
analyzed below. Apart from this matter, it is quite clear under the
law of treaties that the United States does not become a party to
the agreements or to the related instruments arising out of the
Camp David process.
Legally, the association of the United States with the Camp
David process must be categorized as providing "good offices."
This is-the process by which a third state takes the initiative to
bring two disputing parties together to solve their differences. Indeed, the United Nations mediator in Palestine in 1948 described
the process as: "[A] consequence of a tender of good offices, and
of the mediator is to initiate proposals calculated to harmonize
conflicting interests and claims. 6 This is basically a flexible
method, and no technical rules of international law apply to this
process, which invariably is used differently in diverse situations.
The International Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (Hague Convention) generally calls for third
parties to come forward and use their good offices to help two
disputants solve their controversies amicably.6 9 This Article posits
that the United States provided good offices to bring about a
reconcilation between Egypt and Israel. The process had begun
earlier, but in the summer of 1978 it appeared to have stalled.
President Carter, with outstanding initiative, created the setting
that enabled the two sides to assemble at Camp David and finally
agree to the documents that eventually produced the Peace
Treaty and other accompanying instruments. This initiative, however, does not make the United States a party to the agreements
that operate according to their terms between Egypt and Israel.
B.

Historical Approach of Interpretation

Application of the historical approach must begin with an examination of the degree of United States involvement in the period prior to and during the negotiations resulting in the various
instruments analyzed in this Article. Under the historical approach, one must look back at least as far as Security Council
Resolution 242,70 which was confirmed by the Camp David agreements in 1978. This famous Resolution was passed unanimously
68. L. SOHN, CASES

ON UNITED NATIONS LAW

433 (2d ed. 1968).

69. July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1779, I.T.S. 230. The Hague Convention was revised in 1907.
70.- 22 U.N. SCOR (1382d mtg.) at 8, U.N. Doc. S/INF. 22/Rev. 2 (1967).
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on November 22, 1967, by the Security Council after the 1967 war
between Israel and the Arab States. 7' Because the Resolution
passed unanimously, it clearly had the affirmative support of the
United States. The Resolution essentially called upon Israel to
withdraw from territories occupied during the 1967 war.7 2 In addition, this Resolution envisaged a future in which every state in
the region lived in peace with secure and recognized boundaries.73
For more than a decade, the prospects of peace in the region
remained gloomy; Resolution 242 remained unfulfilled and another war, in 1973, came and went. 4 At the same time the focus
of international efforts, in addition to hoping that Resolution 242
would be implemented, gradually shifted to finding a comprehensive Middle East settlement and, therefore, to addressing the Palestinian question. Even after Camp David,"5 Egypt and Israel
continue to disagree on the nature of this problem. Nevertheless,
the Camp David process itself refers to this matter. The need for
a solution to the Palestinian question as a precedent to settlement of the Middle East turmoil is further emphasized, at least
as far as the United States is concerned, by President Reagan's
proposal of September 1, 1982.6
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Prior to Security Council Resolution 242, the Fifth Emergency Special
Session of the General Assembly had been unsuccessful in producing a resolution. See The Latin American Draft Resolution, U.N. G.A. (5th Emergency Special Sess.) at 1, U.N. Doc. A/L. 523/Rev. 1 (1967); Non-Aligned Draft Resolution,
U.N. G.A. (5th Emergency Special Sess.) at 1, U.N. Doc. A/L. 522/Rev. 1 (1967).

For an analysis of this Resolution, see Bassiouni, The Middle East in Transition: From War to War, A Proposed Solution, 4 INT'L LAW. 379 (1970); Bassiouni & Fisher, The Arab-Israeli Conflict-Real and Apparent Issues: An Insight into Its Future from the Lessons of the Past, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 399
(1970).

74. See S.C. Res. 338, 28 U.N. SCOR (1747th plen. mtg.) at 1, U.N. Doc. S1
Res/338 (1973). It is pertinent to notice that while Res. 242 envisaged no particular form of negotiations, the later Res. 338 specifically expected negotiations
between the parties "under appropriate auspices," to implement the substantive
parts of Res. 242. Id.
75. For an Israeli version of this matter, see Peace in the Middle East:
Camp David, the Treaty and Beyond, 74 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 106, 107
(1980) (remarks of Yehuda Blum). For an Egyptian interpretation, see id. at 110

(remarks of Nabil A. Elaraby).
76.

See Transcript of President's Address to Nation on West Bank and

Palestinians,N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1982, at All, col. 1. The legitimate rights of
the Palestinians were acknowledged by the 1973 Algiers Arab Summit and 1974
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The impasse between Israel and the Arab world was broken in
1977 when President Sadat made his historic visit to Israel. As a
consequence, Egypt immediately was ousted from the Arab
League and became the sole Arab state negotiating with Israel.
Several months elapsed and nothing tangible emerged. President
Carter then personally invited both President Sadat and Prime
Minister Begin to be guests of the United States Government at
Camp David. After intense negotiations spreading over several
days, the Camp David accords eventually were formulated and
announced on September 17, 1978.
This brief account stresses one major point. Though during the
ten years following the 1967 war both Egypt and Israel remained
unable to agree to any part of Resolution 242, and even though
President Sadat's trip to Israel in 1977 did not result in any immediate, tangible agreement between the two countries, the
United States involvement produced consequences of far-reaching
significance. The United States unquestionably invested a great
deal to ensure an outcome with the potential for ushering in an
era of peace. It is equally clear that the resulting peace between
the two countries was entirely due to the Camp David
agreements.
Nevertheless, even under an application of this historical
method of interpretation, the United States cannot be considered
a party to the agreements under international law. At this point
in the analysis, there is no reasonable basis for concluding that
the United States was playing any role greater than that of providing "good offices." This historical method of interpreting a
treaty does nothing more than highlight the great input of the
United States in the Camp David process. That involvement cannot make the United States a party to these agreements under
international law.
Rabat Arab Summit. The Palestinian question is mentioned in several U.N. resolutions. E.g., G.A. Res. 3376, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/

10034 (1975); G.A. Res. 3236, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 4, U.N. Doc. Al
9631 (1974); G.A. Res. 3089, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 26, U.N. Doc. A/

9030 (1973); G.A. Res. 2963, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 27, U.N. Doc. A/
8739 (1972); G.A. Res. 2792, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 29) at 46, U.N. Doc. A/

8429 (1971); G.A. Res. 2672, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 21) at 35, U.N. Doc. Al
8028 (1970); G.A. Res. 2535, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 25, U.N. Doc. Al

7630 (1969); G.A. Res. 2452, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 21, U.N. Doc. A/
7218 (1968).
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C. Unilaterally Undertaken Obligations of the United States
The important "unilateral declarations" which might conceivably come under this heading have been discussed in section II. As
previously stated, unilateral declaration means the assumption of
a duty without the corresponding quid pro quo coming from the
beneficiary of that obligation. In other words, it is fundamentally
different from a treaty or agreement in which two parties agree to
mutually acceptable rights or duties. Here a state, which is not a
party to a treaty, unilaterally assumes a duty towards another by
its independent commitment to do so.
It seems that the United States assumed such obligations in
several of the instruments described in section II. One appears in
the Peace Treaty. Article VII of the Appendix to Annex I of the
Peace Treaty dealt with various security arrangements that were
outlined with respect to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the
Sinai. Among these security arrangements was a provision giving
the United States the role of providing aerial surveillance. 7 The
purpose of this clause was to ensure compliance with the treaty
provisions relating to withdrawal. That the United States agreed
to perform this service is manifest from the facts of the situation.
Though this was clearly a unilateral act voluntarily undertaken to
aid the implementation of the treaty between Egypt and Israel, it
automatically terminated with the transfer of the Sinai to Egypt.
Though jurisprudentially it was the voluntary assumption of a
service for the benefit of the parties to the treaty, it may be more
appropriately called an aspect of the good offices that the United
States provided for bringing about peace. Because this aspect of
the good offices, by its own terms,7 8 came to an end with the return of the Egyptian territory, it is unnecessary to examine this
matter further.
The letter of President Carter of March 26, 1979, 7 as already
explained, refers to two matters relevant to unilateral declarations. First, the latter part of this communication to Egypt (not
to Israel) emphasizes that, if the United Nations fails to station
77. Treaty of Peace, supra note 27, Annex I, app. 1, art. VII, para. 2, reprinted at 384. The treaty provides: "Both Parties request the United States
operated Sinai Field Mission to continue its operations in accordance with previous agreements until completion of the Israeli withdrawal from the area east of
the Giddi and Mitla Passes. Thereafter, the Mission will be terminated." Id.
78. Id.
79. Id., reprinted at 532-33.

19831

CAMP DAVID PEACE PROCESS

peacekeeping forces, then the United States, subject to its constitutional procedures, will attempt to create a multinational force.8 0
This voluntary contribution to the implementation of the treaty
was obviously very important because its impact continued beyond the withdrawal stage. Nevertheless, it contained a double
qualification: it was not unequivocal; and it was subject to the
requirements of the United States Constitution. Second, the
United States undertook first to make efforts at progress in the
United Nations and, failing that, to obtain a multinational force
for peacekeeping duties. With these built-in limitations, it is difficult to construe this gesture as the assumption of an unqualified
binding obligation such as one would find in a treaty or bilateral
agreement. Indeed, as discussed below, when the United States
did assume such a clear obligation, it did so by the traditional
method of an agreement. The most that can be said for this gesture of the United States is that, though it did not bind the
United States in law, it did signal in the strongest terms the political importance that President Carter placed on the United States
commitment to the Camp David process.
A second notable aspect of this letter is its suggestion that the
United States volunteered to be consulted by one or both of the
parties in the event of a violation or threatened violation of the
Peace Treaty.8 1 Whether in law this automatically makes the
United States an arbitrator or mediator requires examination.
First, this letter is addressed only to Egypt. Because the Peace
Treaty to which the letter relates is between Egypt and Israel, it
is very doubtful whether an argument can be made that the letter
has bilateral repercussions. Apart from its role as a political statement that the United States would be ready to offer its good offices, the letter does not create any legal obligation on the part of
the United States. If the letter had been addressed to Israel and
Egypt, and if both parties had accepted its terms, perhaps an argument could be made that the letter was in the nature of an
arbitration compromis, but that is not the case. In sum, this is
not an instrument that might create a reference to binding arbitration. The same conclusion is reached for a second reason: the
Peace Treaty itself does not have such a clause. Two clauses may
be examined in this context. First, article VII reads as follows:
"Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this
80. Id., reprinted at 533.
81. Id., reprinted at 532.
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Treaty shall be resolved by negotiations. . . . Any such disputes
which cannot be settled by negotiations shall be resolved by conciliation or submitted to arbitration."' Though the parties seem
to agree to solve their disputes by the various methods mentioned
therein, there is clearly no statement that the United States will
be the third party to resolve the dispute if and when it arises.
Thus, this letter clearly cannot be read in a way which supersedes
this clause to include the United States as a necessary offeror of
arbitration or good offices. Conversely, if the parties wanted the
United States to serve that function, it would have been mentioned in this clause and not relegated to a letter addressed to
only one of the parties and written by the United States. Moreover, clause VI says in part: "The Parties undertake to fulfill in
good faith their obligations under this Treaty, without regard to
action or inaction of any other party and independently of any
instrument external to this Treaty.""3 This good faith requirement is also not strong enough to make the United States, because of its involvement in the Peace Treaty, an automatic mediator, as the letter in question might suggest at first glance. In
conclusion, the letter cannot be deemed to be a compromis for
compulsory arbitration proceedings. It is yet another example of
political involvement by the United States in the events following
the withdrawal of Israel from the Egyptian territory and does not
by itself produce any legal consequences.
That the two other states involved in the peace process accepted the letter as a statement of political intent to keep the
United States involved in the post-Treaty stage-particularly
with regard to the autonomy talks concerning the Palestinians-is
evident from the last paragraph of the joint Egyptian-Israeli letter concerning future negotiations dated March 26, 1979. It reads:
"This letter also confirms our understanding that the United
States Government will participate fully in all stages of negotiations. '84 It thus appears that the intention was to keep the
United States attached and involved in the post-Treaty developments. These are, however, pronouncements of a political nature
and do not produce any clear or tangible legal consequences.

82. Id. art. VII, reprinted at 366.
83. Id. art. VI, para. 2, reprinted at 365.

84. Letter from Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to President Carter (Mar. 26, 1979) (Egyptian-Israeli Letter
on Future Negotiations), reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 530, 531 (1979).
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The third instrument to be discussed is the letter written by
Egypt to protect the memorandum of agreement between the
United States and Israel dated March 26, 1979.85 The Egyptian
letter dated a day earlier opposes the draft of this agreement.8"
The two Egyptian letters concerning this matter were discussed
earlier. The interesting point in the first letter is the description
of the United States by the Egyptian Prime Minister as a full
partner and not as an arbiter.8 7 Though the United States is
clearly not a party to the Treaty, one must conclude that, on a
political plane, the Egyptians wanted to ensure that United
States involvement continued beyond the Treaty.
In the same context, clause 2 of the Memorandum of Agreement between the United States and Israel s (which is bilateral
and binding) that produced this Egyptian letter contains the
statement that the United States will, in an appropriate manner,
mediate if a violation of the Peace Treaty is proved to the satisfaction of the United States. Because this is a bilateral understanding between two of the three necessary parties to any future
controversy of this kind, the comments already made with respect
to President Carter's letter to Egypt dated March 26, 1979, apply
here. This is not the equivalent of an arbitration compromis. Any
agreement between the United States and Israel cannot be incorporated into the Treaty and deemed to create compulsory arbitration proceedings. Indeed, as already noted, Egypt expressly denied any intent to create such a role for the United States under
the Peace Treaty. Hence, it must be concluded that the United
States does not acquire any legal obligations which necessarily involve -it as an arbitrator for future disputes. Any involvement will
continue to be on the political plane.
One last instrument requires attention: the Memorandum between the United States and Israel relating to the supply of oil.
As discussed earlier, the Memorandum is a binding, bilateral
agreement. It is one of the few instruments that unambiguously
gives rise to obligations for the United States within the ambit of
the Camp David agreements. Similarly, the Memorandum of
85.

Letter from Egyptian Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs Mostafa Khalil

to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance (Mar. 26, 1979), reprinted in id. at 540.
86. Letter from Egyptian Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs Mostafa Khalil
to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance (Mar. 25, 1979), reprinted in id. at 536.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 537.
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Agreement between the United States and Israel dated March 26,
1979, is an agreement between the United States and Israel and
operative in accordance with its terms. Because both of these instruments are essentially bilateral, they do not pose any peculiar
problems. They affect the United States as any other treaty or
agreement would.
D. Congressional Action in Pursuance of the Camp David
Agreements
Though it is submitted that the United States is not a party to
most of the Camp David instruments, whether construed liberally
or literally, and it did not become in law an arbitrator or mediator, the United States did undertake some commitments of a
financial nature. Such commitments, contained in a few letters of
bilateral agreements, were eventually placed before the Congress
for necessary approval. Principally, four major commitments
made by the United States were separately placed before the
Congress for its consideration and appropriate action.89 Three of
these commitments were to Israel, and one was to Egypt.
The first United States commitment related to United States
funding and construction of air and military bases for Israel following withdrawal from the Sinai.9" The second related to an ex.tension of the 1975 agreement between the United States and
Israel for providing oil to that country for a five year period at
market prices. That period was later extended to fifteen years.9 1
The third United States commitment related to Egypt. In a letter
from Defense Secretary Harold Brown, the United States agreed
to the sale of military services and equipment over a three year
period. These sales, valued at $1.5 billion, were to be financed by
89. See Middle East Peace Package: Hearings on S. 1007 Before the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as

Hearings on Peace Package]. The Peace Package bill was introduced "to authorize supplemental international security assistance for the fiscal year 1979 in

support of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel and related agreements,
and for other purposes." Id. at 2. The letters and memoranda of agreements

necessitating this legislation are cited in an appendix in the form of tables. Id. at
71.

90. Id. at 152 (agreement to grant $800 million for two airbases); id. at 180
(three year commitment of aid totaling $3 billion: the $800 million grant and the

rest in loans).
91.

Id. at 17, 54 (statements by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance).
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Foreign Military Security credits. 92 The fourth United States

commitment related to a memorandum between the United
States and Israel and a letter containing assurances executed by
President Carter, President Sadat, and Prime Minister Begin.

These assurances concerned the stationing of United Nations personnel in the zone where the respective forces of parties to the
Peace Treaty were limited.93

The object of placing these important United States commitments before Congress was to obtain the necessary legislation to

fulfill substantial financial obligations. Broadly speaking, these
commitments or assurances envisaged an acceleration of aid to

Egypt, in addition to the wider obligations assumed vis-h-vis
Israel. 94 The aid package to Israel was in addition to the approximately $1.8 billion given annually to that country.9 5

The extent of some of these financial obligations can be seen by
looking at some of the features of the International Security As-

sistance Act of 1979.98 It is clear that, although the United States
in not technically a party to the main Camp David agreements,
nevertheless, through separate letters of assurance or agreements

it assumed huge financial commitments toward the parties. These
commitments did not really form part of the two Frameworks or
the Peace Treaty, but were executed and agreed to in related
instruments.

92. Id. at 182.
93. For details of these assurances, see Egypt-Israel-United States: Letters
and Memoranda Concerning the Treaty of Peace,18 I.L.M. 530, 533 (1979) (letter from President Carter to President Sadat); id. at 539 (memo of agreement
between the United States and Israel).
94. This aid was in addition to that provided by the International Security
Assistance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-384, 92 Stat. 730 (codified in scattered
sections of 22 U.S.C.) (Supp. IV 1980); see also Foreign Assistance and Related
Programs Appropriations Acts, 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-481, 92 Stat. 1591, 22
U.S.C. §§ 262(c), 262(d), 262(h), 2169 (Supp. IV 1980).
95. During fiscal years 1977 and 1978, this figure included $2.111 billion in
grants and $1.52 billion in loans. Hearings on Peace Package, supra note 89, at
183-84.
96. Pub. L. 96-92, 93 Stat. 701 (codified in scattered sections 22 U.S.C.)
(Supp. IV 1980). Under this Act, Israel received $800 million for reconstructing
bases, $2.2 billion as compensation for vacating and moving operations after
leaving the Sinai, and Egypt was to be given $1.5 billion in military assistance
and $300 million in economic aid. S. REP. No. 113, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979).
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CONCLUSION

A. The United States, the Frameworks, and the Peace Treaty
Section V of this Article concluded that, apart from some obligations that the United States voluntarily undertook in the Camp
David process, the United States is not a party under international law to the two Frameworks or to the Peace Treaty between
Egypt and Israel. These obligations were, in essence, substantial
financial incentives that the United States voluntarily offered to
encourage the establishment of peace between the other two nations. Because the discharge of these obligations involved the expenditure of large amounts of funds in the foreign affairs field, in
keeping with United States constitutional requirements and existing laws they were placed before Congress for appropriate legislative action. Recourse to Congress was necessary and had been
mentioned in a letter of March 26, 1979, that was issued in conjunction with the Peace Treaty. In that letter President Carter
said that "subject to United States constitutional process," the
United States would be prepared to take steps toward the creation of a multinational peacekeeping force. Apart from the obligations that already have been analyzed, the United States has no
duty or right under international law in the Camp David process
vis-A-vis the two other states involved, or ergo omnes.
The following conclusions can be drawn from the various instruments. First, the United States is not a party to the two
Frameworks or to the Treaty. Second, the United States provided
its good offices to the two parties to the Camp David agreements.
Third, though not a party, the United States offered various assurances to both Egypt and Israel to aid the implementation of
the Peace Treaty and to be helpful thereafter in the post-Treaty
matters (e.g., autonomy talks for the West Bank and Gaza). Some
of these assurances are in letters, and others are in Memoranda of
Agreement. Fourth, the several bilateral undertakings of the kind
described above show that the United States has assumed obligations involving military and other types of assistance. Most of
these obligations benefit Israel; a few benefit Egypt.
B. The Nature of United States Undertakings
None of the above matters have the binding effect that agreements with the status of a defense or security treaty would have
for the United States. All undertakings are found in the letters or
Memoranda of Agreement. Conversely, they are not part of the
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Treaty or the two Frameworks. Thus, they do not formally commit the United States to any action in the events connected with
the Treaty. Furthermore, most of these assurances or bilateral
undertakings are expressly made subject to the United States
constitutional processes. In terms of United States law, the form
and content of the commitments is in the nature of traditionally
concluded "executive agreements." Because many of these commitments were then incorporated in foreign assistance legislation,
they also attained the status of statutory obligations.
C. The Future United States Role in the Middle East Peace
Process
Although no duty or right accrues to the United States under
the main Camp David instruments (except for obligations of a
financial nature discussed above), there remains the question of
what role the United States should play in the future of the Middle East peace process. This is essentially a political question, not
a legal one. In response to the crisis that began with the Israeli
invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, the United States indicated
concern for its vital long-term interests in that region by initiating "shuttle diplomacy" involving Ambassador Habib. As earlier
observed, some of the important matters have been focused upon
in President Reagan's proposals enunciated on September 1,
1982.
At the moment it appears to be certain that one phase of the
Camp David process-that of realizing peace between Egypt and
Israel-has reached its culmination with the signing of the Peace
Treaty on March 26, 1979, and with the exchange of instruments
of ratification on April 25, 1979. By the spring of 1982, return of
the last portion of Egyptian territory finalized implementation of
some of the major steps envisaged by the Peace Treaty. Indeed,
achievement of this goal seems to be the major political and legal
accomplishment of the Camp David process.
Return of the last part of the Sinai, however, still leaves three
difficult questions unresolved in the context of the larger peace
that the Camp David process called for: (i) the question of Palestinian "autonomy" for the inhabitants of the West Bank and
Gaza; (ii) the status of Jerusalem; and (iii) the matter of "settle97
ments" on the Israeli-occupied territories still await a solution.

97. See Egypt-Israel-United States: Camp David Agreements, 17 I.L.M.
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At the writing of this Article, it is difficult to conceive that
Israel and Egypt will be able to resolve these matters by themselves. The Camp David agreements do not specifically resolve
these questions and certainly do not make an Egyptian-Israeli
peace contingent upon any wider, regional peace, although that
may in fact happen. Even the autonomy matter, which is addressed by the Agreements, seems to have gone nowhere.9 8 There
is also a growing feeling that, with the return of the Sinai, the
Agreements have either accomplished their realistic goals or essentially are finished in the sense of having failed to achieve the
wider peace that clearly was a purpose of the Agreements. 9 Nevertheless, the United States, because of its global power and the
financial obligations allocated to the implementation of the agreements, cannot accept failure of the accords. President Reagan's
proposals of September 1, 1982, probably were issued for this reason. The object of those proposals clearly was to renew with vigor
the good offices process initiated at Camp David. The United
States is aware that, unless the underlying questions posed above
are resolved, a solely Egyptian-Israeli peace will fail to remove
tensions from that troubled region.
The cost of war, both from the viewpoint of finances and politics, is extraordinary for the United States. Information provided
by Secretary Vance to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in
1463, 1466 (1978) (text of frameworks). While the concept of returning Israeli
occupied territory is clearly the underlying theme of the peace process, Jerusalem is not mentioned by name in either of the two frameworks, or in the Treaty
of Peace. President Sadat, in his letter of September 17, 1978, to President
Carter, asserts that Arab Jerusalem is part of the West Bank, id. at 1473, and
Prime Minister Begin, in his letter of March 17, 1978, to President Carter,
stresses that "Jerusalem is one city, indivisible, the Capital of the State of
Israel." Id.
98. See West Bank Folly, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1979, at A30, col. 1, for the
following comment on the "autonomy" issue:
Israel is turning the offer of "autonomy" to Palestinian arabs into a sham.
Under the cover of a developing peace with Egypt, Prime Minister Begin
and his Cabinet seem to be doing their utmost to frustrate the other half
of the Camp David Accords. They are provoking even moderate West
Bank leaders into hostility and binding them to the. Palestine Liberation
Organization. How the Israelis expect to negotiate with people they seem
determined to humiliate is almost beyond understanding.
99. See, e.g., Sceptical Start, ECONOMIST, Mar. 17, 1979, at 62. See generally
Murphy, To Bring to an End the State of War: The Egyptian-Israeli Peace
Treaty, 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 897 (1979).
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1979 (when the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty was signed) estimated that the cost to the United States-quite apart from the
losses to the combatants-of the four Arab-Israeli wars between
1948 and 1973 was $55 billion to $70 billion. 100 These cost estimates suggest the reason why President Carter agreed to the future commitment of large amounts of money as a consequence of
the Camp David Accords. 01
It is thus clear that, despite the absence of any clear obligations
on the part of the United States embodied in the Camp David
agreements, political policy and economic constraints demand
that the United States attempt to bring the prospect for a comprehensive peace in that troubled area closer to reality. If the
peace is realized-and it is a very problematical "if'-then and
only then will it be possible to improve the economies of these
war-ravaged countries. The United States must play an important
role in this recovery.10° For these matters to reach a reasonably
100. 125 CONG. Rsc. S5175-76 (daily ed. May 2, 1979) (study by Secretary of
State Cyrus Vance).
101. For an overview of these obligations, see Hearings on Peace Package,
supranote 89, at 71 (memorandum to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee).
The memorandum provides:
As a result of the Treaty, the Administration has committed itself to
seeking Congressional approval for an additional $4.8 billion in foreign assistance, of which Israel would receive $3 billion and Egypt $1.8 billion.
The legislation, which was formally submitted to Congress on April 6,
would authorize appropriations of $1.47 billion to finance the $4.8 billion
in programs .... The Administration is requesting that the total package
be approved as a fiscal year 1979 supplemental authorization.
The legislation would authorize the following for Israel:
A grant of $800 million in defense articles and services for the relocation
of two airbases from the Sinai to the Negev.
Appropriations of $220 million to guarantee $2.2 billion in foreign military sales credits to Israel to finance procurement through fiscal year 1982
of defense articles and defense services.
The legislation would authorize the following for Egypt:
Appropriations of $150 million to guarantee $1.5 billion in foreign military credit sales to finance procurement through fiscal year 1982 of defense
articles and services.
Appropriations of $300 million in economic assistance, of which approximately $200 million would be in the form of grants and $100 million in
loans.
Id.
102. President Sadat envisaged, analogizing from the Marshall Plan, a
"Carter Plan" for bringing in United States and European investment of approximately $15 billion for Egypt alone. Bombs and Ugly Rhetoric, TnmE,Apr. 2,
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satisfactory conclusion, the United States must continue to be
closely involved in the events now taking place in the Middle
East.

1979, at 28.

